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In this paper, I present two ethnographic examples of young Japanese who as members of the lay 
Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai in Japan support the political party Komeito. I highlight that 
concord about interpretations of meaning between the anthropologist and the interlocutors 
makes for different understanding of motivation and subsequently for different representations. 
While the anthropologist’s work in most cases remains an ethnographic account written by the 
researcher, fieldwork and personal interaction with people who are regarded as interlocutors 
rather than subjects of study help to make the subject community, not the observer, the people 
who set the criteria for representation. This does not exclude a critical approach to the social 
phenomenon researched, but a closer understanding of the paradigmatic position of the people 
whom one writes about can, with careful reflection, help to overcome the particular biases of 
structural objectivism. While this position may have its own biases, the starting point is the 
participation of the anthropologist in inter-cultural discourse with the people studied, rather than 
an authority who has the last say on the matter. This is looking at social phenomena from the level 
of meaning, aiming to understand social tendencies to action rather than from a position that asks 
questions about facticity from a deductive approach about an abstract empirical reality.  
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from a cross-cultural perspective, the rationalist framework constitutes local 
native theory and forms a part of the object of study (Ouroussoff, 2001: 38) 
Introduction 
My research focuses on young Japanese who, as members of the Buddhist organiza-
tion Soka Gakkai (value-creation society), support the political party Komeito 
(Clean Government Party), a party that grew out of it in 1964. Soka Gakkai 
International (SGI) has some twelve million members worldwide, ten of which are 
in Japan. It is the biggest out of a number of lay Buddhist organizations that follow 
the thirteen-century monk Nichiren (1222–1282). Apart from many religious activi-
ties, members often engage in civic and cultural activities, hosting exhibitions on 
nuclear disarmament or environmental protection, activities that aim to raise 
awareness about the plight and issues that face peoples of the world. Such social 
objectives are part of what religious practice means to people in Soka Gakkai. 
However, in Japan, what attracts most public attention are not these activities but 
Soka Gakkai’s controversial involvement in supporting the political party Komeito. 
The two organizations are institutionally separate legal entities; Soka Gakkai sees 
itself as in a similar position to a labour union that provides organized electoral 
support to the party it favours. However, despite a political agenda that is social 
democratic and to the centre in politics, Soka Gakkai members’ motivation for this 
political participation is often judged and regarded as questionable. It is often 
portrayed as a search for political power to protect the Soka Gakkai itself and 
further the influence of its long-term spiritual leader Ikeda Daisaku. The political 
activism of Soka Gakkai members is likely to continue to be portrayed as contro-
versial as long as they direct their political objectives primarily into supporting a 
single party. While not all Soka Gakkai members canvass or vote for Komeito, the 
majority of active members (probably about half of the Soka Gakkai membership) 
are likely to continue their support into the future. To understand why such 
support for Komeito is likely to be forthcoming despite the controversy it creates 
requires an in-depth study of the subject. I here explore the motivation for this 
relatively unanimous support for one political party by a religious organization. I 
argue that though it may seem from a structural or deductive approach that Soka 
Gakkai members are voting “en masse” as it were, this does not mean we can so 
easily conclude that they do not exercise independent political judgment. Nor does 
it mean we can conclude that their political activities are therefore non-political, 
that is, as if they simply support Komeito out of loyalty to Soka Gakkai, inde-
pendent of political agenda. A political science perspective or deductive approach 
relies heavily on a priori definitions of politics, such as who gets what, when and 
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how (Lasswell, 1950). Politics at this level is essentially analysed in terms of the 
power acquired, which, however, does not necessarily mean there is a correlation 
between relatively unanimous support for a political party by a religious organiza-
tion and unthinking people engaged in non-independent and even non-political 
activism who are used in order to achieve a power based for its own sake. To 
explore this, it is necessary to direct our attention to the notoriously difficult sub-
ject of motivation, something that was the starting point of Weber’s sociology, and 
that distinguished him from Durkheim’s deductive “social fact” level of analysis on 
which political scientists often conclusively seem to draw. I base my conclusions on 
firsthand participation in and observations of grassroots political activities among 
young Soka Gakkai members spanning the general elections in 2003 and 2004, which 
were the focus of my PhD fieldwork, as well as on post-PhD fieldwork research 
during the election of 2009. This research is based on hundreds of conversations, 
more than fifty interviews with Soka Gakkai members, and Soka Gakkai and Komeito 
officials. Komeito, a centrist party, for ten years (1999–2009) joined hands in a coali-
tion government with the Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP, the conservative politi-
cal party that has been in power in Japan almost uninterruptedly since WWII. They 
lost the August 2009 election for the Lower House. 
 The discussion revolves around three main issues: firstly, whether the claim to 
religious motivation should be accepted at face value especially as religious adher-
ents engage in politics. Alternatively, one could argue that politicians are always 
essentially power seeking, which is seen as not squaring up with religion very well. 
The common sense assumption and “secular” critique is that political motivation 
based on religious beliefs and practice is somehow improper or abnormal. I address 
this issue through a kind of insider/outsider distinction (what political supporters 
claim, what outside observers claim, what “inside” observers claim). Related to this 
is the Japanese (or Japanese media) ambivalence or even hostility to religious 
groups’ involvement in politics. This ambivalence revolves around the secular 
critique of religion, and around Japan’s particular history of State Shinto. A third 
issue is the way my own relative co-religionist subject position (as an SGI-member 
in the UK) complicates the insider/outsider distinction, not least because it pre-
disposes me to accept some irreducible component to religious experience and the 
motivations that stem from it. In other words, I am less likely to accept the ambiva-
lence or hostility towards this religion felt by those whose views I report ethno-
graphically here. I argue that one’s paradigmatic position (see Scholte, 1980) 
creates the “common sense” that underlies different positions and subsequent 
interpretation, however “distant” one’s outsiderhood in connection to the social 
phenomenon under study. This will always result in interpreting someone else’s 
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social world, and in this case political objectives, at least partially from that 
perspective. I further argue that compared to a deductively perceived “reality” of 
social facts (in the Durkheimian sense) fieldwork based on empathetic under-
standing and interaction is bound to provide a different level of analysis. In the 
deductive approach social phenomenon is defined a priori with people fundamen-
tally viewed as objects in need of accurate categorization. There is little recognition 
that “truth” is also a social practice, the stance the anthropologist tends to take. In 
the latter case, subjects are diverse individuals with whom the anthropologist 
enters into an inter-cultural discourse that seeks a more in depth understanding of 
social reality. Each individual is never the same as the person next to them, and 
always experiences the social world from his or her subject position. Even within 
certain general patterns found within the same religious or political beliefs, a 
subject position is unique. In this sense, the anthropologist’s analysis is seen as 
drawing on an amalgamation of a polyphonic (Bahktin) social reality. This is not to 
say that the anthropologist can avoid or wants to avoid some forms for abstractica-
tion and generalization, but such conclusions are made from a thoroughly grounded 
and inductive approach.  
 The difference between the two positions is one of degree in which the first 
more decisively makes the observer the authority while the other tries inductively 
to make the subject community the criteria for representation, a position recog-
nized as never wholly tenable. The core activity is still social description of some-
one else, a position that remains problematic however inductive the level of 
analysis. While standards of objectivity bear the clear mark of history so does the 
process of recognizing this fact. In Discourse and Language (1976), Foucault discusses 
how the production of truth is to be understood as statements capable of being 
taken seriously as true or false. This epistemological dilemma is central to anthro-
pological knowledge, and central to understanding the power of the homogenizing 
discourses that surrounds the case under study. Moreover, my concern here is also 
focused on the anthropologist as “half-native,” a position that emphasizes the 
epistemological tensions between observed/observer, tensions that therefore do 
not so easily map onto the insider/outsider distinction, or onto the secular/reli-
gious division of modern social science disciplines. To explore “the inescapable 
ambivalence and ambiguity of subject-positions” (Battaglia, 1999: 123), I focus on 
the way the agency of young people who are members of a new religion in Japan is 
interpreted. Although the Soka Gakkai movement is very successful in Japan, 
members are widely perceived to be somehow submerged in “mass” or unthinking 
behaviour, especially in their support for Komeito.  
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Political Representations and New Religious 
Movements in Japan 
When it comes to attempts to depict “Japanese” engagement (or lack thereof) with 
their political world, mono-cultural and abstract notions of national identity are 
often used. Much political science writing on Japan has emphasized the forces of 
dominant political ideologies, and the binding character of normative construc-
tions of the Japanese citizen (e.g. Curtis, 1988; Johnson, 1995; Van Wolferen, 1989; 
Hoye, 1999; McVeigh, 1998; Abe et al., 1994; Scheiner, 2006). Stressing the homo-
geneity of social groups that bolster prevailing relations of power in the modern 
Japanese nation-state, Japan has been depicted as a society where social experience 
is determined by social structure to such an extent that it squeezes out much 
individual agency. The typical epistemological problem of confusing a normative 
ideal with the reality, or ideologies with practice (Goodman and Refsing, 1992; cf. 
Roberts, 2005) too quickly turns to generalized arguments. In this way, the indivi-
dual fits rather neatly into a Radcliffe-Brownian structural-funtionalist model. In 
Japan, the view of civil society has been largely one of apathy with Japanese 
democracy as something of a farce where the Liberal Democratic Party rule and 
voters having little say in, understanding of or interests in securing democracy 
proper. People who do engage in politics are usually part of support groups (koenkai) 
that are seen to be primarily clientelist in kind with supporters motivated by self-
interest within a political system largely ruled by pork-barrel politics (Lipson, 1993; 
Schaede, 1995; Christensen, 2000; cf. Stockwin, 2008). The potential variety of 
perspectives and complexity of experiences of people who supposedly exist within 
these wider social discourses are at best obscure.  
 Few studies have focused on what actually goes on at the grassroots level. My 
focus on young people arose as an attempt to explore the widely perceived notion 
that Japanese youths in particular are politically apathetic, lacking in agency within 
a wider social system that is largely antithetical to individual choice and creativity. 
Recent anthropological studies have found a mixed picture (Mathews and White, 
2004). Some conclude that young people’s lived experience is either so socialized 
that they cannot but reproduce an overly controlling adult world. Other young 
people have had such an awful experience of growing up that they end up isolated 
or dropping out of the system all together, while others cope better and success-
fully create new types of social networks (Kotani, 2004; Sakurai, 2004; Kobayashi, 
2001; Nakano and Wagatsuma, 2004; White, 2004). Yet, there are few if any exam-
ples of young people being involved with organized activities that address common 
social concerns. Contrary to this, I highlight instances of young individuals who 
canvass for a party that attempts to address wider political issues such as adequate 
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welfare provision, environmental protection, human rights and international 
peace. A further caveat is that these young people are not to be found among the 
consumers of popular culture whom some describe as changing the social land-
scape of Japan, but in a new religious organization. Members of such organizations 
have not previously been considered in such positive terms. 
 After 1945, when State Shinto ceased to be a state-driven public civil religion a 
pluralism of independent religious organizations emerged. While Japan was seen to 
become democratic, religion continued to flourish (Reader and Tanabe, 1998). 
Japanese modernity and post-industrial society have not coincided with the decline 
of religion, the main thrust of the secularization theory (e.g. van Bremen, 1995). 
While so-called “traditional” Buddhism and Shinto continued to exist, the number 
of people belonging to lay-oriented new religions, or shinshūkyō, grew tremendously 
and they were also the most active in community activities (see Earhart, 1984; 
Inoue et al., 1996; Hardacre, 2003, 2004; Shimazono, 2004). Whether we can continue 
to refer to such organizations as “new” has been debated, but it was a term that 
came into parlance in Japanese scholarship in the 1970s (Reader, 2005). This term 
refers to certain sectarian developments within Shinto and Buddhism that began 
mostly some time in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. Indeed, a group 
could have existed for two hundred years and still be referred to as “new” (see 
Shimazono, 2004: 234, table 12.1). The NRMs scholar Hardacre (2003) estimates that 
around one quarter of the Japanese population belong to a new religion; another 
scholar, Shimazono (2004), believes it to be somewhere between ten to twenty per-
cent. Soka Gakkai, established in 1930, is today the largest of these organizations.  
 These religious organizations serve the public good in various ways. They run 
schools, hospitals, orphanages, homes for the elderly, and museums; they organize 
concerts, exhibitions, collect aid for disaster relief, and volunteer in a multitude of 
ways. Some of them such as Soka Gakkai are active in a variety of peace activities 
that they often coordinate with the UN as NGOs. For instance, Soka Gakkai has been 
involved with a variety of anti-nuclear activities for close to half a century, and is 
still actively involved in furthering the NPT. However, they do not enjoy much 
public trust in Japan (Hardacre, 2003; Ishii, 2000). Murō (2000) shows how the tradi-
tional print and broadcast media refrain from reporting any good news about 
religion or even legal verdicts favourable to religion. Hardacre (2003) notes that the 
lack of trust in new religious organizations is primarily due to a politicization of 
public opinion regarding religion, as well as the emergence of so-called “new-new” 
religions, religions that appeared from the 1970s onwards (cf. Reader, 2005). One of 
these in particular, the Aum Shinrikyō, had fatal consequences for the public in the 
mid-1990s (e.g. Metraux, 1999). This coincided with a time when political parties 
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belonging to the opposition, of which Komeito was a major force, were enjoying 
increasing public support. One political tactic on the part of the LDP to undermine 
the opposition was to establish links in the public mind between Soka Gakkai and 
Aum (LoBreglio, 1997; Yuki, 1997; Kisala, 1999; Hardacre, 2003).  
 Furthermore, contrary to the West (Europe and North America), belief in one 
religion at the exclusion of belief in others conjures up notions of a too intense 
religiosity, a religiosity that in other cultural context would be taken as a given. In 
the West, religious syncretism generally is seen to be the province of dangerous 
sects or new age movements. Japan, on the other hand, has a long history of reli-
gious syncretism, or religious co-existence even within the same temple or shrine 
premises. Choice of one religion somehow is associated with the experience of State 
Shinto, which brings back unwelcome memories of a time when one religion was 
supreme. The tradition of religious syncretism makes the choice of one religion at 
the exclusion of others seems unnatural or un-Japanese, a kind of religious “exclu-
sivism” that is associated with Soka Gakkai in particular (see Nakamaki, 2003). This 
feeds into other representations of these organizations as typical Japanese vertical 
organizational structures that foster absolutism and a strong collectivism. Some of 
the most influential studies of Japanese political culture undertaken by Kunio 
Yanagida and Ruth Benedict, and from Masao Muruyama to Chie Nakano have 
shown the Japanese to fit such kind of homogenous social groups. Interpreting new 
religious organizations in a similar fashion by focusing on supposedly manipulative 
social structures, Soka Gakkai has even been described as bordering on fascism 
(Davis, 1991). Nakane’s famous depiction of new religions as mirroring “Japan’s 
former military system” in which “the astonishing success of these new religious 
groups…seems to be attributable mainly to their system of vertical organisation” 
(1998 [1970]: 61) still widely informs basic assumptions about Soka Gakkai in Japan.  
 Soka Gakkai’s seemingly fanatical proselytization in the 1950s and 60s coupled 
with its increasing political influence (White, 1970) contributed to this image of 
danger in its early days, an image that often remains the starting point for analys-
ing Soka Gakkai’s political involvement. Many religious groups in Japan support 
political parties or candidates (for instance the rightwing Shinto Political Federa-
tion, see Hardacre, 2005) although little data on this is forthcoming, but suspicion, 
if not caricature, of Soka Gakkai’s support for Komeito has remained the order of 
the day as shall be seen in the next section. Its success in the religious and political 
world has therefore been difficult to comprehend, and usually attributed to 
superior organizational skills. Its organizational structure is undoubtedly a contri-
buting factor, but this still does not account for why people vote for Komeito, or 
why people are attracted to Soka Gakkai. 
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An Obedient Foot Soldier or a Participating Citizen 
The first ethnography is of a press conference at the Foreign Correspondence Club 
of Japan where Takao Toshikawa, a famous political commentator and journalist, 
explains Soka Gakkai members’ political activities at a publicly overwrought time - 
three days prior to the 2003 general election. Attending this press conference 
turned out to be an interesting start to my fieldwork because Soka Gakkai mem-
bers’ support for Komeito was represented as the determining factor in the election. 
Toshikawa, regarded by some as an astute political commentator, started by 
announcing in English that today he would be speaking through an interpreter 
because what he was going to say was too important to risk any misunderstanding. 
Switching to Japanese, he announced his predictions for which party would take 
how many seats. It soon became clear from his words that a worrying situation was 
developing: namely the increasing influence of Komeito and thereby Soka Gakkai, 
the millions of members of which, according to Toshikawa, do exactly what their 
leaders tell them. “Why do I stress the Komeito and Soka Gakkai factor?” Toshikawa 
asked, before outlining how the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was losing support 
from its traditional support groups due to structural reforms enforced by the then 
prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, because “after the election, power will depend 
day-by-day on the support of Komeito and Soka Gakkai.”  
 Two thirds of his speech appeared to be devoted to talking about the 
“Komeito/Soka Gakkai factor.” After he had finished his speech, someone from the 
press asked why Toshikawa kept stressing the influence of absentee voters. His 
answer returned to the “primary factor.” “There are about 650,000 absentee voters, 
and 60% of those come from Soka Gakkai members. People in the LDP and Soka 
Gakkai know this and can mobilise this number.” There was a follow-up question: 
“Why would they want to vote absentee - are you trying to say that Soka Gakkai 
obtain absentee ballots illegally?” Answer: “it is important to realise that Soka 
Gakkai has very good co-ordination in the districts and that they start half a year 
earlier to prepare for the election. They have members moving official residences. 
The Soka Gakkai analyse and co-ordinate with the LDP. Where the LDP is weak, they 
mobilise Soka Gakkai accordingly.”  
 The question remained hanging in the air – were they or were they not 
obtaining absentee ballots illegally. Just as I was wondering if Toshikawa was going 
to be more specific as to why the Komeito/Soka Gakkai factor was such an unwel-
come influence in politics, the second question to that effect came: “What specific 
influence does the Komeito/Soka Gakkai have on policies?” To which Toshikawa 
answered: “I am by no means a foot soldier of the Soka Gakkai. The LDP and 
Komeito differ in basic policies. Komeito is for big government, whereas Koizumi is 
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for small government. The Komeito has the backing of Daisaku Ikeda, who has 
stated that Komeito must remain in the coalition, that they must stay to maintain 
political power. It is possible that in November 700 Self Defence Forces will be sent 
to Iraq. Within the Soka Gakkai there are many subgroups that are against this, but 
Soka Gakkai has made the decision in order to stay in power. Information about this 
comes from NHK, Yomiuri, Asahi and internal documents from Soka Gakkai.”  
 Then a curious thing happened. At hearing Toshikawa’s reply, the journalist 
from the Financial Times who had asked the question rose to his feet again to make 
a stammering apology saying, “I by no means meant to say that you were a foot 
soldier of the Soka Gakkai,” although it was obvious that no such thing had been 
implied from his question. Toshikawa in his position as the guru of political 
analyses coupled with his many articles about what seemed to be his pet subject, 
Soka Gakkai and Komeito, hardly made his own position ambivalent: he was by no 
means a secret admirer. This moment was penetrated with the “commonsensical” 
view that Soka Gakkai as a religious organization was a negative social force tres-
passing into the political world. The felt need not to appear to be questioning this 
common sense had been so overwhelming that an independent journalist rose to 
his feet to apologize for an opinion that he had not even expressed. No one laughed 
and the atmosphere was tense. The common sense that the political support for 
Komeito constitutes the activities of unthinking, religious foot soldiers, instructed 
by authoritative social hierarchies of leadership is a view that resonates with other 
recent works on the topic (Eto and Hichiri, 2003; Yamada, 2004; Sado, 2005).  
 The second ethnography looks more closely at some of the young “foot soldiers” 
who canvass for Komeito. Nami was a twenty-three year old law student, a devoted 
Soka Gakkai member and from Okinawa originally. She was also an active Komeito 
supporter. She happened to be looking for a roommate and a part-time job when I 
arrived in Japan in October 2003, which meant that I could stay with her, and she 
looked after my seven-month-old daughter. We became good friends as well. As the 
upcoming election in November was approaching Nami was out most nights meet-
ing with other young women who were also studying at Soka University in 
Hachioji, Tokyo, where they lived. These young women, all in their early twenties 
had decided to meet up to encourage each other to call up potential voters and to 
try to get them to vote for Komeito. At these small gatherings, the young women 
always first chanted together – repeating at a fast and rhythmic pace the phrase 
Nam-myoho-renge-kyo, which they took to have been declared by Nichiren as the 
way to develop an inner directed, spiritually rich, and compassionate state of mind, 
something they referred to as Buddhahood. After chanting, from which they clearly 
felt invigorated, they began telephoning potential voters – friends, acquaintances, 
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and old school mates. Most of these young women were, like Nami, from places 
other than Hachioji – Niigata, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima - living in Hachioji because 
they were Soka University students. They were calling people in their hometown to 
try to get them to vote for the Komeito there. Conversations with potential voters 
lasted anything from one minute stammering out the reason for why they had 
called, to half-hour-long conversations about politics, the importance of voting to 
have a say, and various social and political issues of the day.  
 Nami was active not only in her religious activities but also in trying to achieve 
political objectives through her support for Komeito. The political objectives were 
centred on a political agenda of improving social welfare, education, environmental 
protection, and other issues that could best be described as social democratic. Upon 
our return from the nightly gatherings, Nami and I often discussed late into the 
night about Komeito policies, about Soka Gakkai, about the complexity of the rela-
tionship between the two and about Daisaku Ikeda, the long-term spiritual leader of 
Soka Gakkai whom they call Sensei, or mentor/teacher. Nami was clear about her 
objectives and reasons for supporting Komeito, as most of them seemed to be when 
they discussed Komeito policies compared to other parties. They hoped, and mostly 
trusted that Komeito tried its best to influence politics towards creating a more 
humane society, a society that stressed social welfare, equality, and peace. When 
asked about the purpose of being involved in politics, their answers reflected what 
they had learned from Ikeda’s writings, namely, that Komeito was and should be a 
party that worked for the betterment of society as a whole. They expected Komeito 
politicians to have personal integrity, to be free of corruption, and to work on the 
side of people who were struggling with daily life. Young Soka Gakkai women in 
Nami’s area would often pass by and I participated in many discussions, conversa-
tions during this time that always returned to the political issues of the election. It 
was a lively place to live and engage in “after hours” participant observation 
(Gellner and Hirsch, 2001: 7).  
 Despite Nami’s all-out support for the party, she was by no means an uncritical 
supporter. The conversations often turned to the inherently problematic nature of 
supporting a political party, especially as a small party in a coalition government 
with a much more powerful partner. How could supporters be sure that politicians 
were trying their best to influence policies in a desired direction without compro-
mising too much with the LDP? Such negotiations were not transparent and they 
had to take Komeito’s word for it. Nami knew that being part of the government as 
a small coalition partner was much less straightforward than being an opposition 
party where stating ideals were their main political drive. The issue of being a 
religious organization that supports a political party was less of a problem in 
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theory as she knew they had sound political objectives. However, there were inher-
ent difficulties in the dynamics of uniting to support one party, and some young 
people were not interested in politics at all. However, the politically active young 
people I spoke to had political ideals that resonated strongly with creating a fairer 
and more humane world. They knew that organized action was needed to achieve 
such objectives, and that this was the challenge, not their ideals. Uniting to support 
one political party had its difficulties. Moreover, given that Soka Gakkai members 
see their own actions as the vehicle for creating a just and compassionate society 
for which support for Komeito was an extension, political compromises facing the 
party as part of the coalition were not always easy to accept. Sometimes the ability 
of Komeito to stand up for its proclaimed ideals of social welfare, peace, and 
environmental protection - social pursuits that clearly arose from their religious 
values – was questioned. Theirs was an ethical approach to life that complicated 
their understanding of the relationship between self and other, between themselves 
and their political objectives rather than simplified it. Religion was not a commit-
ment to a moral code, but an ethical way of being in the social world. Practically 
speaking, when political decisions seemed too contradict Komeito’s stated objec-
tives they would seek the answers either from senior leaders or by writing directly 
to Komeito politicians to voice their objection or to get them to explain their 
decisions. Politicians did not feel far away, also because of the many (some 3000) 
local Komeito politicians to which people can turn relatively easily. Yet, despite this 
local network that aimed to bring the voice of people to the arena of politics, not all 
Soka Gakkai members voted for Komeito. The precise number of such individuals is 
difficult to ascertain, but there were clearly also a significant number of young Soka 
Gakkai members, probably about half who, like other youths more generally, were 
not interested in politics. Moreover, some vote for other parties because they work 
for companies that support for instance the LDP. Komeito lost nine seats in the 
August 2009 Lower House Election, a loss which can at least partly be attributed to 
former Komeito supporters switching to the then popular Minshutō. At one level, 
Toshikawa’s prediction had been apt; the LDP had become increasingly dependent 
on the support of Soka Gakkai members, a support that was not enough to sustain it 
by 2009.  
Representing the “Abnormal” Religious Adherent as 
the Engaged Citizen 
While a political scientist may be seen to be describing facts, he or she arguably less 
clearly accounts for the way motivation is interpreted. The different way in which I 
understand the same young people’s motivation and political action has to do with 
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my methodology and with insider knowledge. As someone who has practised the 
Buddhism expounded in Soka Gakkai for the past twenty years mostly in Hong 
Kong and the UK, but also three years in Japan, I find personal agreement with the 
ethical and social objectives of the organization, objectives which I take for real and 
do not see as mere rhetoric. I am aware that the kind of meaning structures the 
philosophy provides because I am also aware of the way they have restructured my 
own worldview in subtle but profound ways. I am not Japanese, however, and I 
have only lived in Japan as a student of Japan. Still I can relate to the way my infor-
mants engage with the challenging process of actively attempting to take action for 
broader social issues and from an ethical position of mutuality. Evans-Prichard 
made the point, highlighted by Burton (1983: 176) that, “If one disregards the local 
questions, nothing is explained or understood other than the premise of the 
particular theory adhered to.” While we may question the extent to which Evans-
Prichard himself overcame the problem of structural objectivism, this point has 
continued to be important in anthropology. When asked, political scientists will 
comment that because Soka Gakkai does not elect its leadership it is not democ-
ratic; by extension, the democratic nature of its political support for Komeito is 
questionable. By comparison, many non-religious organizations, voluntary and 
otherwise, and most businesses do not elect by popular mandate their manager or 
director, but they are seldom by default categorized as totalitarian or undemocratic. 
Neither is this fact given as the independent variable that explains their success. I 
do not argue that by simply removing what appears to be “rationalist” prejudice 
against religious organizations a non-totalitarian group is revealed whose political 
participation is always welcome. This is obviously something that needs to be 
established on a case-by-case basis.  
 I also need to reflect on the “knowledge” that predisposes me to accept some 
irreducible components to religious experience and the motivations that stem from 
it, as it becomes part of my method. My informants’ knowledge that I was an SGI 
member allowed me to critically observe and question people without them feeling 
defensive. This was because the standard of judgment in many ways was their own. 
I was the implicitly trusted stranger who the interlocutors knew as someone who 
lived her personal life with similar social objectives as they. This in return engaged 
us in a discussion about the complex process of social transformation they saw 
themselves as part of, a social transformation that for them included support for 
Komeito. Support for a political party was something that made this process a lot 
more complex and contentious but it was driven by a desire to contribute to 
greater social transformation. For example, people who had heard about my inter-
est in the dilemma that I imagined SGI members would have when Komeito, as a 
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coalition partner to the LDP, had seemingly supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
were eager to meet me and verbalize their apprehensions about this decision. Had I 
not been an SGI member, I doubt they would have talked quite so frankly about 
these difficult political issues because in the media they were being represented as 
having given up on their ideals of peace through continuing to support Komeito in 
order to maintain political power for its own sake. The situation was a lot more 
complex than that as I discuss elsewhere (forthcoming). In this way, my co-
religionist subject status made Soka Gakkai members who canvassed for Komeito 
approach me without assuming I harboured a huge amount of suspicion regarding 
the “real/suspect/hidden” motives of both Soka Gakkai and Komeito. For me the 
starting point was not that there was something “wrong” with the fact that these 
individuals’ political activism is being directed, perhaps comparatively speaking, 
rather unquestioningly to support one political party. Such relative unanimous 
support for a political party has been more the norm than the exception in Japan, 
where voting according to one’s professional status group or according to the com-
pany for which one works has until more recently characterized Japan’s political 
culture. For instance, bigger companies or professional groups such as the Japan 
Medical or Dentist Associations have traditionally supported the LDP. This tendency 
can be seen at the other end of the political spectrum where for instance certain 
cooperative hospitals expect employees to campaign on behalf of the Communist 
party. Old social and economic networks and collectivist authoritarian value prefer-
ences remain important, but increasingly less so as has been evident with the per-
sonalization of politics and the increase in non-affiliated voters (e.g. Inoguchi, 
2009). “Collectivist” voting patterns may come across as an anomaly against political 
activism in the broader and freer sense. Yet, young Soka Gakkai members’ political 
activism does not reflect obedient masses of followers whose political influence is 
undemocratic. Neither is it an expression of the desire for one religion to reign 
supreme. No political engagement is perfect, but the case under study points to a 
need to address the hegemony of intellectuals and the media that represent reli-
gious persons, a hegemony that allows political commentators to present them-
selves as objective and as people who decisively know what is going on.  
 No one should glance easily over the fact that the anthropologist, and arguably 
the political scientist as well, is a flawed and biased instrument of cultural transla-
tion. For the anthropologist this tension is central because knowledge is based on 
interaction with those one is writing about. This interaction usually takes the form 
of empathic understanding, which does not mean the anthropologist is always 
sympathetic, but there has to be some kind of trust between observed and observer. 
This does not exclude a critical perspective towards the subject under study, but it 
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produces a different kind of critique that is derived from a different type of 
observer/observed relationship, a relationship that does not automatically become 
more objective the greater the distance between the two. I would argue that a 
closer relationship between the experience and the rational account of it need not 
be less objective, indeed it could be more objective, although again, not by default. 
“Insider” objectivity is likely to be different from the more obvious “outsider” 
objectivity where the interpellation of subjects are made prominent to account for 
the production of subjects proper in a particular objectivist form. Any “gaze” is 
created and presents its own inherent political and ethical dimensions as argued by 
Foucault (e.g. 1979). Yet, a perspective can only be problematized if a reflexive 
account of the subject position of the observer, whether an insider or outsider, co-
religionist or non-coreligionist is observed. (This is done usually with the help of 
others, in my case my supervisor during my PhD years).  
 The different ways of viewing Soka Gakkai’s support for Komeito as discussed in 
this article touch on the issue of reconciling theory with ethnography. A reduc-
tionist theory through which religion is viewed as presented by political scientists 
and the media contrasts with my ethnography and firsthand research, which some 
may accuse of being an internal phenomenological perspective. Theory here is seen 
as the product of a reductionist point of view and ethnography as a personalized 
point of view (Kunin, 2006). However, I have argued that both are “personalized” 
views to some extent and are dependent upon how motivation is interpreted. In 
contrast to the views presented by the example of Toshikawa, my observations 
reveal a religious movement that engages in associational life, with the objectives 
of creating a good society, and as people who have conversations in the public 
sphere about public issues. The particular canvassing for Komeito reflects a belief 
and trust in politicians who are seen as political representatives that attempt to 
make broader individual and societal interests their objective. Support does not 
stem solely from personal loyalty to Soka Gakkai, although there are elements of 
that as well. The young people who support Komeito believe in a humanistic phi-
losophy and engage in a religious practice that focuses on inner and outer ethical 
change. Individuals are relatively autonomous thinkers, as much as any of us, but 
are united by a deeper commitment to changing themselves and to furthering 
humanitarian issues in society. However imperfect these processes may be, they 
are the very stuff that makes the objective standards we set for democracy viable. 
Contrary to expectations that arise from representations of obedient flocks of “foot 
soldiers,” these young people attempt to appropriate the very democratic ideals we 
associate with democracy despite the fact that the religious organization to which 
they belong is strictly speaking undemocratic. 
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 In this way, the ethnographic method, to paraphrase Battaglia (1999: 118), finds 
its greater purpose in its struggle against the heavy current of totalizing theories 
that usually are ideologically driven. I take these young people’s motivation at face 
value and as stemming from a sense of goodwill based on a deeper “Buddhist” 
understanding of the mutuality of self and other – not straightforward of course in 
this huge and sometimes bureaucratic organization (something I explore elsewhere 
in relation to gender practices). This, for some, may invoke connotations of being 
too sympathetic or apologetic, or lacking in critical insight. This is a particularly 
contentious issue as the focus is on religious people’s successful involvement with 
organized politics. Politics as a pursuit of power in the state is invariably analysed 
as a pursuit of self-interest. I have tried to stay true to the way my interlocutors 
approached their engagement with politics. This means taking young people’s 
religiously inspired desire to create a more humanistic society for real, and to take 
their political activities to represent attempts to effect change in Japan’s particular 
political world. There is little evidence to the contrary. Illuminating the incom-
pleteness of the picture of Japan as a society that lacks political participation, as a 
society that has a weak civil society, and that possesses insufficient accountability 
of political power (e.g. Stockwin, 2008) has been one objective. Moreover, these 
young people are examples of self-empowerment that results in political change 
and that hold political representatives accountable. Komeito has been successful in 
modifying some of the LDP’s more extreme policy inclinations. I would argue that 
this is an example of a “new religion” acting as a secularizing and democratizing 
force in Japanese society. Rather than religion intruding into the secular domain of 
politics, religious ideas and practices are here actually creative of secular political 
subjects who strive for democracy to work. Therefore, Soka Gakkai members do not 
make up “a huge nonpolitical following that it [Komeito] can count on to mobilise 
on Election Day and tick the right box,” nor is Komeito “essentially a religious 
party” (Richard Smart, The Japan Times, 25 May, 2010), which nevertheless continue 
to be the main arguments presented in media and political discourse.  
 Soka Gakkai is not a collectivist culture, but rather a kind of individualism 
where one’s mental and cultural orientation places self-esteem at the height of 
one’s judgment and that stresses self-reliance or one’s own ability to defend that 
position. However, it is an individualism that fosters the ability to take collective 
action. We need to move beyond seeing democracy as equalling the political sys-
tem, and start to include the places and processes by which people participate. 
While a more macro-level view of politics in Japan is interesting and necessary it 
will not help cast light on the political participation of youths in this study. The 
wider conclusions made about democracy based on a deductive, structural analysis 
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need to be reconsidered to understand that for instance in this case, leadership by 
election in a religious organization would not necessarily facilitate better democ-
ratic practices. In fact, I would argue it would worsen it. By stating this, I do not 
suggest that we can dismiss as insignificant certain authoritarian aspects of 
decision-making in Soka Gakkai. However, to view the political activities of Soka 
Gakkai members as necessarily undemocratic/ unthinking/non-political because 
they do not elect their religious leaders is to put the cart before the horse and 
adhere to structural objectvism that explains social behaviour from the point of 
view of the observer. This may be a valid position but it has to be acknowledged for 
what it is: an interpretation of motivation that need to be validated by eth-
nographic investigation. 
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